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STRUCTURE, RELATIONSHIP, IDEOLOGY, 
OR, HOW WOULD WE KNOW A "NEW 
PUBLIC LAW" IF WE SAW IT? 
Peter M. Shane* 
Academic writings and judicial opinions are the research materials 
most accessible to legal academics. It is thus unsurprising that, when 
asked to discuss "New Public Law," professors of administrative law, 
constitutional law, and legislation focus chiefly on emerging scholar-
ship1 and judicial output.2 This tendency illustrates the general and 
quite understandable phenomenon that people, including law profes-
sors, do most whatever they can do most readily. 
Nevertheless, however elegantly and provocatively we analyze 
each other's work and the labor of judges, discerning whether a new 
public law exists ought to involve a broader inquiry. In this essay I 
explore the complexity of the inquiry. Although I seek to provide 
some reasons for thinking that, in various respects, we may or may not 
have a New Public Law, my purpose is not to answer that inquiry 
definitively but rather to provide a sharpened awareness of the breadth 
of issues that the inquiry poses. 
In what follows, I suggest the range of activities that count as 
"law" is so great, and the ideological as well as material aspects of 
those activities are so important, that assessing change involves deeply 
contestable matters of interpretation. Whether we diagnose change 
depends not only on the data on which we focus, but on the questions 
we pose to the data. We would use the appellation "New Public Law" 
most reasonably if we interpret our legal culture as manifesting some 
strong and likely enduring changes in direction. I do not. My own 
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa. A.B. 1974, Harvard; J.D. 1977, Yale. - Ed. I 
would like to thank the symposium participants for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper, as well as those of my Iowa colleagues who participated in a discussion of an earlier 
draft during our Works-in-Progress lunch series. I benefited also from the help of research assist-
ants Paul Goddard, Iowa 1992, and Angela Washington, Iowa 1993. 
1. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural 
Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991); Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Schol-
arship, 89 MICH. L. REv. 792 (1991); Strauss, Review Essay: Sunstein, Statutes, and the Common 
Law-Reconciling Markets, The Communal Impulse, and the Mammoth State, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 907 (1991). Including Professor Strauss' work here may be somewhat inapt because he 
uses his review more as a vehicle to express his own interpretation of certain aspects of regulatory 
and judicial activity rather than to comment on the state of scholarship. 
2. Farber & Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the 
New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875 (1991). 
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interpretation bears witness to a great deal of activity, even innovation, 
but not to new ways of thinking about the administrative state, its 
relationship to the people, or the relationship of government organs to 
one another. 
I. INTERPRETING CHANGE 
To identify the New Public Law is to assess change, a quintessen-
tially interpretive task. After all, however we define our subject, some 
change always takes place from one day to the next. Some of those 
who made, implemented, or interpreted law yesterday are missing 
from the stage today. New actors have appeared. The opinions courts 
and agencies write today have different names, paragraphs, and page 
lengths from those of yesterday. Policymakers will be influenced by 
last night's news, which, to some degree, differed from that of the 
night before. To ask if we have a New Public Law is thus not to ask 
whether change has occurred; it has. The question is whether the 
change that has occurred is worth noting. That question cannot be 
answered without interpretation and theory. 
A. What Is ''New"? 
To start most obviously, if we are to search for a New Public Law, 
we must have some way of deciding what is "New." In our society, 
which has not recently undergone any revolutionary experience com-
parable, say, to the fall of Stalinist governments in Eastern Europe, the 
proper way to approach this issue is not obvious. Any ascription of 
"newness" necessarily involves at least three large and difficult issues. 
First, to characterize a public law as new, we must identify some 
past moment in time as an appropriate baseline for comparison, and 
somehow construct a portrait of public law as it then existed. This 
task itself involves complex interpretation. Rather than catalogue all 
the possibilities, however, I will simply designate as my "baseline mo-
ment" the last occasion when someone made a widely accepted case 
for the existence of a New Public Law. That baseline is 1975, when 
Richard Stewart published his article on "The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law."3 
A portrait of public law at that time might refer to: 
1. the great broadening of public law concerns at the federal level 
throughout the 1960s and early 1970s;4 
3. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
4. See Browning, Presidents, Congress and Policy Outcomes: U.S. Social Welfare Expendi-
tures, 1949-77, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 209 (1985). 
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2. the flowering of the "new property" and its implications for due 
process;5 
3. the displacement of adjudication by informal rulemaking as the pri-
mary procedural mode for agency decisionmaking;6 
4. the evolution of judicial concern from an exclusive focus on relieving 
unjustified administrative intrusions into private activity to a focus 
that encompassed administrative failure to implement legislative 
programs with sufficient vigor or comprehensiveness;7 
5. the revolution worked by Watergate in executive legal accountabil-
ity;8 and 
6. judicial efforts to promote within the administrative system "a surro-
gate political process to ensure the fair representation of a wide 
range of affected interests in the process of administrative 
decision."9 
After choosing a mid-1970s baseline and drawing this portrait of 
public law reality, the natural inclination is to construct a portrait of 
similar dimensions for 1991 and to quasi-quantify the distance trav-
ersed for each of these elements. For example, an analysis might try to 
show how much more or less "new property" the law of 1991 protects 
as compared to the law of 1975. 
Merely to state the project this way, however, is to suggest much of 
its problematic character. The half-dozen features of reality I have 
attributed to 1975 form an incomplete list, did not appear at the same 
moment, did not necessarily represent the culmination of preceding 
linear trends, and did not stand in equally low or high relief in mid-
1970s reality. Moreover, features of our public law that were techni-
cally decades old in the mid-1970s are easily left out of the mid-1970s 
portrait, although their full implications are still being worked out in 
new ways and with new self-consciousness today. Like the performer 
who becomes an overnight success after decades in regional theater, 
those phenomena which should now count as critical to a New Public 
Law might be phenomena long practiced, but little noticed until 
recently. 
Matters grow yet more complex. Even if we spot distinctions be-
tween the data of today and the data of yesteryear, we must decide 
5. Reich, The New Property, 13 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). For a bibliography of "new property" 
cases, see Reich, The New Property After 25 Years, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 223, 242 (1990). 
6. J. MAsHAW & D. liARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 5-6 (1990). 
7. See generally Stewart, supra note 3. 
8. For post-Watergate Supreme Court decisions expanding executive accountability to Con-
gress and the Courts, see Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (up-
holding the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800 (1982) (declining to afford absolute immunity in personal damages actions against high 
presidential advisers); and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (extending Harlow rule of 
qualified immunity to the Attorney General). 
9. Stewart, supra note 3, at 1670. 
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what to make of the differences we identify. For example, does more 
or less adjudicative policymaking today suggest a New Public Law? 
Arriving at standards for judging whether what is new is really impor-
tant enough to count as "New" is as problematic as choosing and por-
traying the baseline. 
One attractive standard, however contestable, is easily stated. Our 
public law is "New" if the features we identify imply a theory of the 
state different from the theory of the state most plausibly attributed to 
the public law of our baseline time. By "theory of the state," I mean a 
widespread understanding of the relationship of the state to its citi-
zens, of official institutions to one another, or of the core purposes of 
government activity. 
This standard is demanding. Because changes in prevailing under-
standings of the state and of its role and operations are presumably 
rare, the approach is biased against the diagnosis that new policy de-
velopments are worthy of the title "revolution,'' "paradigm shift," 
"sea change," and the like. The appropriateness of this bias is, of 
course, debatable. The standard may be commendable, however, in 
that it guards against treating as a New Public Law what may better 
be characterized as short-term shifts in the political landscape that are 
unlikely to have enduring impact. 
The third profoundly difficult threshold issue in assessing "what's 
new" is that of perspective. To disabled Americans, the enactment of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act10 may be an event revolutionary 
enough by itself to mark the advent of New Public Law. To prison 
inmates familiar with habeas corpus jurisprudence, the Burger Court's 
retrenchment on prisoner rights may have been a similarly profound 
development. 11 As legal academics, we are presumably susceptible to 
the same temptation felt in any self-identified subpopulation to give 
most weight to that which most directly affects us or the people whose 
lives we encounter. These observations do not suggest that any of the 
above perspectives is right or wrong. Rather, the point is that all such 
perspectives are partial, even if well-rooted in our particular experi-
ence and observation. We should therefore resist the temptation to 
regard the incomplete academic perspective as neutral and universal. 
Instead we must maintain a concentrated awareness of the multiplicity 
10. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
11. See Comment, Lundy, Isaac and Frady: A Trilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 169 (1982). 
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of existing perspectives and remember that the assessment of "New-
ness" depends upon one's situated point of view.12 
B. What Is 'Public Law"? 
Deciding what should count as "New" is clearly not the only pre-
liminary challenge in the search for a New Public Law. We must also 
determine what counts as Public Law. 
Consider law first. Most commonly, we regard as law those formal 
operations through which the coercive power of the state is brought to 
bear on individuals. Statutes and their enactment are law. Judgments 
and the adjudications that produce them are law. To limit law to what 
is contained in West Reporters and statutory codes, however, is like 
treating as religion only what appears in holy or otherwise authorita-
tive texts. It is more profitable to regard law or religion in a more 
encompassing cultural sense, namely, as webs of institutions and prac-
tices through which a society represents to itself its shared understand-
ings of right and wrong - or, to use more legalistic language, the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of individual or governmental activity.13 
What makes law different from religion and art is itself a shared cul-
tural understanding14 that particular varieties of rhetoric (briefs, for 
example, in contrast to prayer), action Gudgment, in contrast to 
prophesy), and authority (the Constitution, in contrast to scripture) 
are legal and not chiefly something else. Law thus extends beyond 
authoritative texts and includes public expectations of law, informal 
bargaining between political institutions, and even the writings of legal 
academics. 
A final uncertainty is how much of this "law" counts as "public 
law." No participant in this symposium was surprised when those in-
vited turned out to be professors of administrative law, constitutional 
law, and legislation. Legal academics habitually associate the public 
law label with cases in which the government is a party or with certain 
categories of work product from certain institutions. The three sub-
jects just identified are the umbrella areas most conventionally associ-
ated with that workproduct and those institutions, at least on the civil 
12. See Minow, On Neutrality, Equality, & Tolerance: New Norms for a Decade of Distinc-
tion, CHANGE, Jan/Feb. 1990, at 17. 
13. See Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common 
Law, reprinted in J. BARTON, J. GIBBS, v. LI & J. MERRYMAN, LAW IN RADICALLY DIFFER-
ENT CULTURES 1-4 (1983); see also C. GEERTZ, Blurred Genres: The Re.figuration of Social 
Thought, in LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 19 
(1983) [hereinafter LocAL KNOWLEDGE]. 
14. See C. GEERTZ, Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, in LocAL KNOWLEDGE, 
supra note 13, at 167. 
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side of the law. The conventional view, however, produces some 
anomalous results. For example, bankruptcy law, which is largely 
statutory, is private law, while wholly judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution are public. The enforcement of statutes by administra-
tive agencies would seem perforce to be public, even though some such 
enforcement may be the adjudication of traditionally private law 
claims.15 
As Professors Farber and Frickey demonstrate, the formal distinc-
tion between "private law" and "public law" may no longer be use-
ful.16 We may be wise to regard as public law all aspects of law which 
have a major impact on the implementation of public policy or collec-
tive interests. This might suggest that all law is public law because 
public policy is implicated, however tenuously, even in contract dis-
putes in small claims courts. Yet, if we are to investigate the reality of 
public law, we should be less concerned about wasting our attention 
on areas of private law that tum out to be marginally related to our 
theoretical interests than ~bout ignoring categories of historically pri-
vate law, such as products liability, bankruptcy, or employment law 
that have become powerful tools for the implementation of social 
policy. 
II. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SOCIAL 0ECISIONMAKERS 
By some measures of public law innovation, it is clear that our 
current public law is at least decades old. For example, the mix of 
institutions for establishing and implementing public law has not 
markedly changed over the past three decades. Nor has the scope of 
public law concerns at the federal level significantly expanded or con-
tracted since the Johnson and Nixon presidencies.17 Public law, how-
ever, may also be assessed by how it embodies and seeks to implement 
some theory of the relationships among different levels and branches 
of government. In this latter context, changes have taken place; what 
to make of these changes is less clear. 
United States law allocates socially significant decisionmaking au-
thority along three divides: private/public, state/federal, and execu-
tive/legislative/judicial. If our public law is changing, one would 
15. See Commodity Futures Trading Commn. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1986). 
16. Farber & Frickey, supra note 2, at 884-88. 
17. A comparison of the tables of contents of federal government manuals from 1973 and 
1990 reveals some reorganization and shifting of responsibilities, but little addition to the scope 
of those responsibilities. Compare OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, UNITED STATES GOV-
ERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 1972/73, at v-viii with OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGIS· 
TER, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1989/90, at v-vii. 
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expect to see shifts along these axes. At a formal level, we would ex-
pect changes in the rules governing the assignment of certain functions 
to particular decisionmakers and in the discretion that governments 
have to rearrange the distribution of power. At the level of practice, 
we would anticipate changes in the actual locus of important decision-
making activity. The picture that emerges in these respects is decid-
edly mixed. In terms of form.al doctrine there is great debate, even 
ferment, but little actual change. Genuine changes are, however, tak-
ing place at the level of practice, although whether or not they amount 
to a New Public Law is uncertain. 
A. The Public/Private Divide 
Consider first the public/private front. The past fifteen years have 
witnessed increasing policy interest in privatization, whether in the 
form of deregulation or in the turnover of public enterprises to private 
ownership and control.18 In the world of practice, this interest has 
produced some change. Most notably, transportation19 and telecom-
munications20 have been deeply deregulated in ways likely to endure. 
Legislators also appear to be more willing to respond to social needs 
by creating incentives for private business to provide solutions to par-
ticular problems, for example, in child care.21 
Yet, it would seem to be an exaggeration to suggest that the private 
sector is somehow displacing the public sector as a source of public 
policy or governing norms. In some deregulated fields, such as finan-
cial services22 and broadcast communications,23 reregulation seems 
18. See Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 507, 507-09 (1985) 
(noting the theoretical and political origins of the movement toward deregulation). On the fed-
eral level, discussion of privatization seems to be limited to contracting for prisons, see Robbins, 
The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531 (1989). One author, 
however, has identified 180 local services which cities and counties have contracted out to private 
firms. E. SAVAS, PRlVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 73-74 (1987). 
19. For critical reviews, see Dempsey, Robber Barons in the Cockpit: The Airline Industry in 
Turbulent Skies, 18 TRANsP. L.J. 133, 135-40 (1990) (describing the effects of deregulation on 
the airline industry), and Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission: Disintegration of an 
American Legal Institution. 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1984) (discussing the legality of the rush by 
the ICC to deregulate the trucking industry). 
20. See Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other 
Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation, 76 GEO. L.J. 59 (1987) (discussing the rejection of 
the Fairness Doctrine by the FCC). 
21. Congress Remembers the Children - Finally, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1990, at D3. 
22. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, 103 Stat. 183, codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. 
23. See, e.g., Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1991) 
(authorizing limited reregulation of televised advertising for children); 136 CoNG. REc. H8536-
4 l (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990). The second session of the lOlst Congress will likely involve signifi-
cant efforts to regulate cable television. 48 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3694 (1990). 
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the likeliest short-term direction. The privatization of education, a 
movement with a substantial academic as well as political pedigree, 
has proceeded· by inches.24 Further, even as large corporations take on 
greater roles as innovators in the provision of social services, the gov-
erning norms they are expected to observe in terms of access, stan-
dards, and fair administration may well be drawn from government. 
Even more fundamentally, no apparent change has occurred in 
legal understanding of the scope of either mandatory or permissible 
private decisionmaking. Despite its apparent political conservatism, 
for example, the post-1980 Supreme Court has not sought to insulate 
private decisionmaking from economic regulation by imposing a more 
exacting constitutional scrutiny.25 Conversely, there is no reason to 
suppose the Court would be less alarmed now than it was during the 
New Deal if the government purported to vest in private deci-
sionmakers the capacity to wield coercive governance power over 
other private actors.26 
B. The State/Federal Divide 
As with the public/private sphere, no change has taken place in 
the conventional understanding of formal principles of constitutional 
federalism. States have become dramatically more important centers 
for government innovation, whether in regulation or in the delivery of 
services.27 Cutbacks in federal programs during the 1980s, coupled 
with occasionally increased federal tolerance for the exercise of state 
discretion in allocating federal aid, helped fuel these changes. So did 
24. For a still relatively rare example of the privatization of public schooling, see Innerst, 
Public Schools Let Private Initiative Take Over, Wash. Times, Nov. 19, 1990, at Al. 
25. Even University of Chicago faculty alumnus Justice Scalia would appear to be opposed to 
any such move. See Scalia, On the Merits of the Frying Pan, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1985, at 
10. 
26. Schechter-like challenges might arise in connection with decisionmaking under the re-
cently enacted Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 
(1990), and Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990). Under the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, the parties to a dispute resolution proceeding involving 
a federal agency may select a private arbitrator to assist in the resolution of the dispute. Admin-
istrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 583, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). Because, 
however, the agency retains plenary authority to terminate an arbitration proceeding or to vacate 
any award before it becomes final, the government may be sufficiently implicated in the exercise 
of the arbitral authority to avoid the problem of excessive delegation to nongovernment actors. 
The Negotiated Rulemaking Act authorizes agencies to involve private parties in negotiating 
certain proposed rules. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 586(a), 104 Stat. 
4969 (1990). Because the product of such private influence, however, is only a proposed rule that 
must still proceed through notice-and-comment rulemaking and receive the agency's imprimatur, 
the government likewise remains implicated in the exercise of policymaking power and avoids 
excessive delegation to nongovernment negotiators. 
27. Bernstein, The New Federalism Hasn't Meant Less Government, Bus. WK., May 2, 1988, 
at 110. 
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improvements in the regularity of state government - for example, as 
of 1985, forty-three state legislatures met annually, compared to eight-
een in 1960.28 In addition, state administration is better funded and 
more highly professionalized than ever before. 
The formal constitutional allocation of decisionmaking authority 
between state and federal governments remains, however, what it was 
in the late 1940s. The federal government retains power to displace 
much state authority, and there is little that Congress may not order 
the states to do. 
For a moment, things appeared to be evolving differently. In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 29 the Supreme Court invented a tenth 
amendment limitation on Congress' authority to command the states 
directly in the implementation of national policy. Between that case 
and its overruling in San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority v. 
Garcia, 30 however, the Supreme Court did not overturn any other di-
rect federal command to the states. 
Indeed, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(PURPA)31 was among the statutes upheld during the 1980s. The Act 
is in some respects a wholesale federal redirection of state regulation 
concerning public utilities, an area of traditional state dominance. The 
Court's willingness to uphold such a statute, even while National 
League of Cities was "good law," testifies to just how little difference 
that earlier case made. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's strenuous dis-
sent32 foreshadowed her position in Garcia that the ubiquity of inter-
state markets, interstate transit, and electronic communications would 
give Congress power under the commerce clause to obliterate any 
original aspiration to preserve states as autonomous policymakers un-
less the Court developed some workable tenth amendment con-
straints.33 Nonetheless, a majority in both the PURPA case and in 
Garcia rejected any creative judicial effort to preserve state autonomy. 
The Garcia Court reverted, instead, to the stance expressed as early as 
Gibbons v. Ogden 34 that the protections for constitutional principles of 
federalism are entirely political. 35 
28. Doyle & Hartle, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the New Federalism • . ., Wash. 
Post Natl. Weekly Ed., Dec. 2, 1985, at 23. 
29. 426 U.S. 833, 840-52 (1976). 
30. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
31. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The Act 
was upheld in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982). 
32. 456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). 
33. 469 U.S. 528, 580-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
34. 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
35. The Garcia majority of five has since lost one member, Justice Brennan, but the dissent-
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C. The Separation of Powers Divide 
The one decisionmaking axis that has produced the most strident 
contests over formal principle on the federal level involves the separa-
tion of powers. If one attends to the dissents of Justice Scalia, one 
might conclude that the Supreme Court's decisions in Morrison v. Ol-
son 36 and Mistretta v. United States31 marked a revolution in constitu-
tional understanding, and that the enactments upheld in those two 
cases portend a drastic shift in the intended distribution of national 
governmental power.38 The better view, however, is that Mistretta is 
of limited practical significance and Mo"ison was entirely predictable 
and well founded on prior constitutional interpretation. It is Justice 
Scalia's view in Morrison that, if adopted, would count as a significant 
departure. 39 
Mo"ison is best understood against the backdrop of recent "pre-
sidentialism,'' in particular, the increased vigor with which Presidents 
over the past quarter century have asserted inherent authority to su-
pervise the policy content of all domestic administration. 40 Presiden-
tialism, and presidential arguments for more control over the 
bureaucracy, are themselves not new. Alarm over the "headless 
fourth branch" and concern that the President have sufficient staff and 
authority to coordinate the evolving administrative apparatus of gov-
ernment were no less concerns of Franklin Roosevelt than of Ronald 
Reagan.41 
Even the most recent presidential initiatives in regulatory over-
sight, however, have not produced any change in conventional legal 
understanding of the locus of decisionmaking authority with respect to 
domestic policy. Defenders of recent presidential initiatives, including 
some legal scholars, have gone beyond arguing that the oversight exec-
utive orders are permissible exercises of presidential power, particu-
larly in light of Congress' forbearance. They have argued that the 
ers have lost two, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger. There is no firm basis for supposing 
that Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter will provide the two votes required in order to revert to 
National League of Cities. 
36. 487 U.S. 654, 685-96 (1988) (upholding independent counsel provisions of Ethics in Gov-
ernment Act of 1978 against separation of powers challenges). 
37. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding structure and governmental laws of United States Sen-
tencing Commission against separation of powers challenges). 
38. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
39. See generally Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional 
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596 (1989). 
40. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 
546-52 (1989). 
41. See I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 1:7, at 22-23 (1978). 
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vesting of executive power in a unitary presidency signals an exclusive 
presidential power of administrative supervision. This power supports 
the oversight orders and is not subject to congressional supervision. 42 
The targets of this line of argument are the so-called "independent" 
agencies, and the supposed immunity from removal of any heads of 
such ~gencies who refuse to follow the policy directives of the Presi-
dent. Although these independent administrators are typically subject 
to discharge for cause, it is conventionally understood that no cause 
for removal would exist merely because an administrator declined to 
follow the President's policy preferences in favor of policy initiatives 
that the administrator preferred and which were also within the ad-
ministrator's lawful discretion. 
The Supreme Court has not expressly decided whether the Presi-
dent has constitutional authority to give binding orders to administra-
tors regarding the exercise of their administrative discretion. The case 
law prior to Morrison sends murky signals at best. The Court had 
held, for example, that Congress would be aggrandizing its adminis-
trative role impermissibly if it (a) insisted that the President get con-
gressional approval before firing an administrator,43 (b) vested in itself 
the power to appoint administrators, 44 or ( c) reserved to itself the 
power to remove administrators by means other than impeachment. 45 
The holdings of these cases do not make clear, however, the extent to 
which these formal limits on Congress' power to take over administra-
tion also imply that the President has supervisory authority that Con-
gress may not limit in other ways. 
The constitutional debate is yet murkier because of Humphrey's 
Executor v. United States, 46 the leading pre-Morrison case upholding 
congressional power to structure administrative relationships. In 
Humphrey's Executor, the Court upheld Congress' authority to limit 
the removability of Federal Trade Commissioners to removal "for 
cause." In explaining its holding, however, the Court described the 
commissioners as occupying "no place in the executive department"47 
and exercising "no part of the executive power vested by the Constitu-
tion in the President."48 Read in a formalistic way, the characteriza-
tion of the FfC as outside the executive department leaves the 
42. See, e.g., Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REv. 41. 
43. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
44. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
45. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
46. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
47. 295 U.S. at 628. 
48. 295 U.S. at 628. 
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Commission in organization-chart limbo, and renders the Court's de-
cisions limiting congressional power over administration more difficult 
to understand. 
Morrison irons out much of the doctrinal difficulty, leaving the sep-
aration of powers landscape basically untouched. Morrison involved 
portions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, as amended,49 
which (a) permit a judicial panel to appoint special prosecutors in a 
limited class of criminal cases, so and (b) limit the Attorney General's 
(and, indirectly, the President's) power to remove such counsel to re-
moval for cause.st 
Because Congress had not attempted to expand its role in the ap-
pointment or removal of independent counsel, the precise issues 
presented in the pre-Morrison cases did not arise. Instead, following 
the express constitutional provision for the appointment of "inferior 
officers" by "courts of law,"s2 the Court inquired first whether an in-
dependent counsel was an "inferior officer" and, if so, whether the 
judicial appointment of such an officer would be incongruous with the 
powers vested in courts by article III. Finding both "inferiorness" of 
offices3 and no incongruity in the judicial appointment of a prosecut-
ing attorney, s4 the Court upheld Congress' prescription for the ap-
pointment of these officers. 
With respect to the "for cause" removal provision, the Court ex-
plicitly rejected a formalistic reading of Humphrey's Executor in favor 
of a more functional reading. According to the Court, the issue with 
respect to removability was not the branch with which an individual 
was traditionally affiliated. Rather, the question was whether limited 
removability would compromise the President's capacity to discharge 
particular functions vested in the President by the Constitution.ss Im-
plicitly determining that the Constitution does not vest in the Presi-
dent the power of criminal prosecution, a proposition well supported 
by history, S6 the Court concluded that limited removability had no 
disabling effect on the President. 
Two features 9f the majority opinion are especially notable. First, 
49. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
~o. 28 u.s.c. § 592 (1988). 
511 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1988). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
53. 487 U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988). 
54. 487 U.S. at 673-77. 
55. 487 U.S. at 685-97. 
56. See Shane, supra note 39, at 603-06; Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Pow-
ers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484-94 (1989). 
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the Court implies that, despite the permissibility of "for cause" limita-
tions on removability, the President must have direct or indirect au-
thority to discharge administrators who are guilty of malfeasance of 
office. Even if the Constitution does not guarantee the President ple-
nary supervision of administration in the area of domestic policy, the 
Constitution does charge the President to "take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed."57 The Court might well read the faithful execu-
tion clause as mandating some presidential removal authority with re-
spect to all officers of the United States. 
Second, the Court fails to employ a narrower and equally conven-
tional course of reasoning. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv-
ices, 58 the Court had earlier articulated a balancing approach to 
separation of powers challenges, under which the Court poses two is-
sues in the case of an asserted separation of powers violation: Does 
the challenged initiative of one branch threaten to undermine the con-
stitutional responsibilities or prerogatives of another branch? If so, is 
the initiative nonetheless justified because of an overbalancing interest 
that is within the initiating branch's authority to pursue?59 
The Morrison Court could have avoided deciding whether limiting 
the President's policy control over criminal prosecution intrudes on 
his constitutional authority. The Court could have simply assumed 
such an intrusion, but nonetheless upheld the Act because it serves an 
overbalancing interest in criminal law enforcement in a narrow class 
of cases in which the executive's conflict of interest in self-policing is 
quite conspicuous. 60 
Because the Court could have but did not adopt such a narrow 
rationale it appears that the Court is unpersuaded by Justice Depart-
ment attacks on independent agencies and by executive insistence on 
exclusive presidential authority to supervise administrative policymak-
ing with respect to domestic affairs. This fact is confirmed by Mis-
tretta v. United States, 61 which upheld the placement under judicial 
administrative supervision of the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion - again, under the necessary premise that the Constitution does 
not vest in the President the particular function that the commission 
performs. · Similar reasoning would presumably support new legisla-
tive limits, should Congress choose to impose them, on presidential 
influence in such areas as environmental policymaking, workplace 
57. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3. 
58. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
59. 433 U.S. at 443. 
60. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b), (c) (1988). 
61. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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safety regulation, and food and drug control because the Constitution 
does not grant the President inherent power to act in any of these 
areas. 
If the Supreme Court were to adopt the theory that the unitary 
presidency implies exclusive presidential policy control over all discre-
tionary domestic policymaking vested in administrative agencies, the 
Court would depart from our public law tradition. Traditionally, 
Congress has primary responsibility for domestic policymaking, and 
the President has whatever supervisory leeway Congress permits. 
Statutory codification of presidential regulatory oversight, 62 or con-
gressional decisions granting the President policy control over in-
dependent agencies, might also reflect a substantial change in the 
prevailing sense of the appropriate distribution of policymaking au-
thority. So far, however, neither change seems likely. 
D. Stability in Theory, Change in Practice? 
The analysis thus far, which has sought out formal change in the 
legal principles governing the distribution of decisionmaking power 
along the public/private, state/federal, and executive/legislative/judi-
cial divides, suggests continuity in U.S. public law. Regarding formal 
principles, there is little new. The world of practice, however, yields 
some contrary evidence. 
For example, although the formal scope of decisionmaking author-
ity may not have increased in the 1980s for the private sector or for 
state governments, the public increasingly viewed the private sector 
and state government as more likely sources of solutions to social 
problems than the federal government. One indication of the growing 
role of the private sector was the dramatic increase throughout the 
1980s in charitable donations, despite a decrease in tax rates that made 
such contributions more expensive for many donors. 63 On the federal-
ism side, the Reagan Administration's determination to "devolve" 
governmental authority back to state and local levels resulted in a 
profound increase in regulatory and social service initiatives in the 
states.64 
62. For discussion of Congress' deliberations on codifying Presidential oversight, see J. 
MAsHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 160-
63 (2d ed. 1985). 
63. See Wilson, Charitable Contributions by Americans; Costs of Giving, NATL. L.J., Nov. 3, 
1990, at 2680 (reporting increases in per household charitable giving in 1989); Volunteering, 
Giving on the Rise, Wash. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at E2 (citing statistics showing a 23% increase 
in the number of people making charitable contributions, between 1987 and 1989); Meyerson, 
One Hundred Conservative Victories in America, POLY. REV., Summer 1987, at 72, 76 (asserting 
a 50% increase in the dollar amount of charitable contributions between 1980 and 1985). 
64. Bernstein, supra note 27, at 110. 
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Whether these events mark changes in our legal culture significant 
enough to constitute a New Public Law is questionable. The impulses 
and concerns leading to a rise in charitable giving might well, over 
time, translate into support for new government programs concerning 
health, safety, and social welfare. The magnitude of many problems, 
both geographic and economic, may defy state and local remedy. The 
preference of interstate business for uniform systems of regulation may 
result in a· return of federal regulatory initiatives. Though both the 
right and left appear discontented with large government institutions, 
and technocratic, top-down solutions to social ills, there simply may 
be insurmountable obstacles to what localism can achieve. We are 
more likely, I suspect, to see the development of sensitivity to local 
concerns within large, centralized government agencies than the dis-
placement of large agencies and centralized programs with grass roots 
controls. 
Separation of powers practice has also evolved notably since 1977. 
The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) more systematic at-
tention, especially under Presidents Carter65 and Reagan, 66 to the rou-
tinization of presidential oversight of regulatory policymaking has 
been a major innovation. 67 These presidential oversight initiatives sig-
nal the advent of a centralized micromanagement of administration 
that represents a probable increase in presidential power. 
Again, however, what these changes mean socially is ambiguous. 
Congress can check presidential power by narrowing the discretion 
vested in those administrators whom the President supervises, by ex-
empting particular categories of regulation from OMB review, by 
promulgating alternative or additional procedures that limit the im-
pact of presidential oversight, or by simply turning up countervailing 
congressional pressure on agencies - through oversight and appropri-
ations hearings - not to submit to OMB's policy preferences. Such 
developments have already occurred to some degree. 68 Moreover, two 
administrative law scholars have called Congress' tendency in the 
1980s to tighten up its delegations of administrative authority to exec-
utive agencies a "quiet revolution" in administrative law, a revolution 
65. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1978), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
66. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981); Exec. Order.No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 
(1985). 
67. See generally Bruff, supra note 40. 
68. For example, Congress expressly exempted from OMB review regulations to be promul-
gated under the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972 Amendments, § 4(d)(2), Pub. L. No. 
97-58, 95 Stat. 979 (1981). Ultimate passage of an act reauthorizing the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1980 appears to be dependent on President Bush's acceptance of certain statutory guaran-
tees of openness in the regulatory review process. 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3699 (1990). 
I 
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that greatly reduces the potential policy impact of presidential 
oversight. 69 
III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND "THE 
PEOPLE" 
In addition to embodying a theory of institutional relationships, 
public law also manifests the legal system's prevailing assumptions 
about the relationship of government to the people. At least two as-
pects of this relationship are worth highlighting. The first is the na-
ture of government accountability. The second is the degree to which 
public law manifests a conventional view of public welfare programs 
as obligatory or discretionary. Under an obligatory view, law is inter-
preted and government behaves as if government owes individuals cer-
tain affirmative duties. We might expect, for example, that citizens 
under such a government would enjoy some form of Franklin 
Roosevelt's second Bill of Rights. Conversely, under a discretionary 
view of government, law is interpreted and government behaves as if 
the services that government provides are mere privileges, and as if 
private, rather than public, institutions are the ordinary and most im-
portant sources of moral and material support for individual 
sustenance. 
A. Accountability to the People and Its Implementation 
In terms of notable innovations, our public law arguably is "new-
est" with regard to the appropriate enforcement of official accountabil-
ity. Although the substantive impact of recent changes is not yet 
clear, we appear to be moving increasingly in the direction of legal and 
bureaucratic accountability for government decisionmakers and, in 
some notable respects, away from direct democratic accountability. 
At some point, the changes in degree may be significant enough to 
regard as changes in kind. 
A series of cases in which the Supreme Court has rendered uncon-
stitutional most forms of patronage hiring and firing illustrates the re-
cent movement. Beginning with Elrod v. Burns70 in 1976, the Court 
has evolved a constitutional doctrine that the first amendment pre-
cludes both discharges and refusals to hire71 on a partisan basis unless 
69. See Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in 
Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819. 
70. 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (invalidating patronage-based discharges of sheriff's office 
employees). 
71. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990) (invalidating patronage-based 
promotions, transfers, recalls, and hiring of low-level civil service employees). 
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the position involved is one for which partisan affiliation can reason-
ably be regarded as a job-related qualification. The mere fact that the 
position involves discretionary decisionmaking or even the possession 
of confidential information is not enough to satisfy this test. If a posi-
tion is subjected to partisan control, it must involve the making or 
implementing of policy of a kind and at a level to which partisanship is 
relevant. 72 
It would take extensive and sophisticated research to know how 
many jobs are likely affected by this legal change, and what the real-
world impact of the change will be. Analytically, however, it seems all 
but certain that these cases will further the general breakdown of party 
discipline as a source of official accountability and increase the signifi-
cance of other accountability measures, such as bureaucratic perform-
ance evaluation and judicial review. 
These cases further a trend in which legal and bureaucratic ac-
countability rhetoric is elevated on all fronts, with an ever more obvi-
ous blurring of the line between legal and political accountability. Not 
surprisingly, because of the breadth of much statutory delegation, 
agencies are necessarily called upon to function conspicuously as 
policymakers in the implementation of statutes. Their policy choices, 
whether embodied in the reading of a statute or in its direct implemen-
tation, are reviewable on explicitly political grounds by both Congress 
and OMB. Agencies also face judicial review to assure their nonarbi-
trariness under the Administrative Procedure Act.73 Notwithstanding 
occasional judicial protestations to the contrary, this form of account-
ability enables courts to second-guess agency policy choices signifi-
cantly and to call such supervision "law."74 
72. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (invalidating patronage-b!!Sed discharge of assistant 
public defender). 
73. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988). 
74. Reports that Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984), would mark the death of traditional judicial oversight of agency legal interpretation have 
proven premature. In Chevron, the Court stated that reasonable agency interpretations of law 
are entitled to judicial deference unless "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue" in a manner contrary to the agency. 467 U.S. at 842. Such a command, if read literally, 
would augur extraordinary deference to agency policymaking in the form of statutory interpreta-
tion because Congress so often speaks with ambiguity on important questions. 
Yet, the Court has not foreswom its authority to resort to the full panoply of "traditional 
tools of statutory construction" for determining an agency's correctness. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). The Court still overturns agency 
legal interpretations regularly, and cannot be counted on even to discuss the Chevron framework 
as it assesses an agency's legal interpretation. See Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex 
rel. Moore, 108 S. Ct. 2428 (1988) (never mentioning Chevron while upholding FERC's interpre-
tation of its regulatory authority as preemptive of state authority on the prudence of certain 
utility management decisions); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board v. Dimension 
Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986) (rebuffing the Board's attempt to regulate under the Bank 
Holding Company Act all institutions which use NOW accounts); Maislin Industries, U.S., v. 
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' What seems new, however, is that the elevation of law over politics 
has affected congressional oversight as well. The events collectively 
called "Watergate" precipitated a sharp turn to formal law as a source 
of control over executive officials. 75 Although too much should not be 
made of a few examples, it is remarkable that Congress used the spe-
cial prosecutor mechanism, rather than appropriations, as the vehicle 
for retaliating against the Reagan Administration for refusing to share 
environmental regulation information with Congress. 76 The key over-
sight issue in the Iran-Contra episode was whether anyone broke the 
law, and "what did the President know and when did he know it?"77 
The key congressional response on accountability, so far, for the sav-
ings-and-loan debacle has been the "Keating Five" ethics proceed-
ing. 78 During fall 1990, when President Bush commenced deploying 
military personnel to Saudi Arabia to mount offensive operations 
against Iraq, the dominant issue in interbranch debates over the de-
ployment was whether the President complied with the War Powers 
Resolution. 79 In these various episodes of possible political malfunc-
Primary Steel Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990) (rejecting an ICC interpretation of the Interstate 
Commerce Act under which, contrary to an 80-year-old Supreme Court decision, it would be an 
"unreasonable practice" for a carrier to seek enforcement of a high rate filed with the ICC after 
negotiating a lower rate with a particular shipper); Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990) 
(upholding, without reference to Chevron, an interpretation of the AFDC Act that excludes 
"child insurance benefits" received through Social Security from the category of "child support 
payments" calculated with respect to Aid to Families with Dependent Children); Dole v. United 
Steelworkers, 110 S. Ct. 929 (1990) (rejecting OMB claim of authority under Paperwork Reduc-
tion Act of 1980 to review agency regulations requiring employers to publish to employees cer-
tain information on hazardous substances in the workplace). 
75. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1867 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
76. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDI· 
CIARY, INVESTIGATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE JN THE WITHHOLDING OF ENVIRON· 
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY DOCUMENTS FROM CONGRESS JN 1982-83, H.R. REP. No. 435, 
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (4 vols.). 
77. See generally H.R. REP. No. 433, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. REP. No. 216, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
78. See Keating Five are in the Dock. But Congress Is Being Judged, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 
1990, § 4, at 6, col. 1. 
79. See Sorting Out Legal War Concerning Real War. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1990, §A, at 18, 
col. 1 (summarizing arguments between Congress and President over War Powers Resolution 
application to U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf and alluding to similar tensions sur-
rounding the U.S. invasions of Grenada and Panama). When the 102d Congress convened in 
January, 1991, it did turn to political debate concerning the deployment of troops in the Persian 
Gulf, ultimately enacting authority for the President to use the armed forces offensively. S.J. 
Res. No. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REc. S403 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 
1991); H.J. Res. No. 77, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 137 CONG. REC. H443 (daily 
ed. Jan. 12, 1991). At least some observers contend, however, that Congress abdicated its re-
sponsibilities in failing to turn to a political discussion until presidential initiatives rendered it 
politically impossible for Congress to dissent from a strategy of offensive military action. See 
Rowan, A Majority of One, Wash. Post Natl. Weekly Ed., Jan. 28-Feb. 3, 1991, at 5. 
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tion, Congress has invoked the rhetoric of law more prominently than 
the rhetoric of democratic accountability. 
The rhetoric of law has distinct advantages when different political 
parties control the legislative and executive branches. If Congress re-
taliates politically for executive missteps, those missteps take on the 
appearance of mere partisan differences. Conversely, the executive en-
counters more difficulty defending what can plausibly be characterized 
as illegality. Yet, whether the sharpened post-Watergate focus on the 
legal accountability of even our highest executive policymakers has 
done anything to conform their behavior with greater certainty to the 
views of the electorate remains unclear. Legal accountability is a 
"good," but it is not all that accountability has to offer. 
Congress' tum toward legality as the rubric for accountability also 
coincides with an institutional development worthy of intensive study 
- the advent of inspectors general.80 Since the mid-1970s, Congress 
has turned increasingly to this mechanism both to help assure congres-
sional access to information about agency operations and to help mon-
itor agency compliance with law. The most dramatic extension of the 
inspector general concept is its inception in the Central Intelligence 
Agency,81 an organization that was barely under any system of ac-
countability outside the executive branch until reforms inspired by the 
Church Committee report of 197 6. 82 
Yet another indicator of the increasing tendency of law to struc-
ture politics is the explosion of litigation during the 1970s concerning 
separation of powers issues. To cite one crude, but revealing statistic, 
the phrase "separation of powers" appeared in federal court of appeals 
opinions 185 times between 1960 and 1969, 559 times between 1970 
and 1979, and 1273 times between 1980 and 1988.83 The increase in 
separation of powers litigation is consistent with other evidence that 
interbranch conflicts are escalating and are more frequently being de-
bated, if not always resolved, in legalistic terms. Among the conflict's 
innovative forms is the debate over the juridical significance of presi-
80. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-9 (1988). The act is summarized in 
Muellenburg & Volzer, Inspector General Act of 1978, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1049 (1980), and its legal-
ity is analyzed in Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of 
Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REv. 59 (1983). 
81. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-193, 103 Stat. 1701, 
1711-15 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403(q)). 
82. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPER-
ATIONS WITH REsPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcuvmES, s. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1976) (6 vols.). 
83. See Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 402-04 (1989). 
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dential signing statements in delimiting the meaning of statutes. 84 
Although these developments suggest an increasing tum to formal 
legal mechanisms and formal legal rhetoric as instruments of account-
ability in our political life, this is not the whole story. There is an 
important push within government for moving beyond what are often 
decried as the excessively costly and excessively adversarial common 
modes of major policymaking. 85 In its most recent session, Congress 
authorized both agency arbitration86 and negotiated rulemaking87 as 
mechanisms for streamlining both formal adjudication and informal 
rulemaking. Whether these authorizations will promote substantially 
innovative activity is unclear. A significant tum in their direction, 
however, could result in a changed understanding of the relationship 
of administration to "the people." 
A new relationship is perhaps easiest to see in the case of negoti-
ated rulemaking. Under the new Negotiated Rulemaking Act, agen-
cies are authorized to formulate proposed rules through a process of 
negotiation with those interests most significantly affected. This pro-
cedure does not involve the sort of wholesale investment of govern-
ment power in private decisionmakers overturned in Schechter 
Poultry. 88 The formulation of a negotiated rulemaking committee is 
itself subject to public notice and comment. 89 In addition, the com-
mittee produces a proposed rule, which, to become effective, must be 
adopted by an authorized administrator following notice and com-
ment. 90 Any final rule is subject to judicial review to the same extent 
84. For contrasting views on this issue, see Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Signi.fi· 
cance of Presidential "Signing Statements," 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209 (1988), and Garber & Wim· 
mer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive 
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 363 (1987). 
85. For example, the Administrative Conference of the United States has recently recom· 
mended that federal agencies study the potential of an agency "ombudsman" as an effective, 
informal mechanism for enhancing agency responsiveness to the public. 55 Fed. Reg. 13,279 
(1990) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305) (proposed Apr. 10, 1990). Although this mechanism is 
more widely utilized by state and local governments, it is not unknown at the federal level. 
Major agencies that use ombudsmen include the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Department of Commerce. 
Anderson & Stockton, Ombudsmen in Federal Agencies: The Theory and the Practice 1 (Report 
to the Administrative Conference of the United States May, 1990). 
86. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). 
87. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (1990). 
88. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (asserting that 
Congress could not "delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups 
so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilita· 
tion and expansion of their trade or industries."). 
89. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, supra note 87, at § 584(a). 
90. The anticipated product of a negotiated rulemaking committee is described as a "pro-
posed rule." Negotiated Rulemaking Act, supra note 87, at § 586(f). Nothing in the Act ex· 
empts the proposal, once offered, from the otherwise applicable rulemaking provisions of 5 
u.s.c. § 553. 
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that it would have been had the agency not engaged in negotiated 
rulemaking.91 Although the Act thus preserves the formalities of offi-
cial government responsibility for decisionmaking and unfettered op-
portunities for public input, in operation it could quite easily result in 
changes in the nature of private interest representation in policymak-
ing. This process is thus worthy of extensive empirical and theoretical 
study. 
The past quarter century of administrative law can be assessed in 
light of our foundational administrative law case, Marbury v. 
Madison. 92 John Marshall, of course, constitutionalized the distinc-
tion between judicially reviewable ministerial obligations of public offi-
cials and their political acts, for which an official is "accountable only 
to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience."93 
The substantial innovations of the past twenty-five years effectively 
have reduced the scope of the latter category. Yet, while law's juris-
diction over politics expands, unease remains over the formalizing or 
judicializing of administration, and innovations have appeared in the 
mechanisms by which administrative discretion is respected, even ad-
vanced. It is still too early to discern whether this constellation of 
activity will give rise over time to new understandings of the nature of 
accountability. 
B. Government Obligation and Discretion 
Locating a governmental system along the "obligatory-discretion-
ary" axis is a daunting interpretive task. First, even under a view of 
government as discretionary, certain legal principles, such as the non-
discrimination principle, may operate to ensure some significant sub-
stantive benefits for great numbers of people. Moreover, as always, 
legal theory and political practice may not coincide. A government 
that expressly disavows any obligations to the citizenry may decide, as 
a matter of discretion, to provide a substantial array of welfare benefits 
for all citizens. A government, the constitution of which guarantees 
all sorts of minimum benefits, may implement those guarantees in a 
more or less meaningless way. 
In the United States, both the New Deal and the Great Society 
marked significant moves in ideology and practice towards an obliga-
tory view of government. The shift in practice came :first. Total public 
welfare expenditures by federal, state, and local governments more 
91. Negotiated Rulemaking Act, supra note 87, at§ 590. 
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
93. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. 
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than doubled in the two years between 1932 and 1934.94 The sixty 
percent increase between 1966 and 1968 marked the next greatest two-
year jump. 95 
By 1970, the shift in legal interpretation was evidenced by judicial 
acceptance of key aspects of Charles Reich's "new property" thesis of 
1964,96 most markedly the disavowal of the "right - privilege distinc-
tion" in the administration of public benefits. Legislative decisions 
during the 1960s substantially increased the variety of social benefits 
distributed on an entitlements basis. Because of judicial decisions, 
most importantly Goldberg v. Kelly, 91 the confined discretion under 
which social benefits were distributed resulted in an elaborate system 
of procedural protections against the loss of those benefits. 
From these developments alone, one might safely conclude that 
the period of 1930 to 1970 marked a real change in public law. One 
might also safely say that the period from 1975 to 1985 did not ad-
vance the trend toward obligatory government. Between 1975 and 
1984, total government spending as a share of gross national product 
grew from 33.1 to 33.6%.98 During that same period, however, 
means-tested transfer payments and targeted spending for education 
and training each declined a tenth of a percentage point.99 The growth 
that did occur in poverty spending's share of GNP resulted fropi in-
creased social insurance payments, most notably health and unem-
ployment insurance. too This picture does not reveal whether we have 
actually moved back toward a pre-New Deal vision of government or 
have simply failed to advance as far in the direction of government 
obligation as seemed plausible in the late 1960s. Indications for the 
future are likewise mixed. 
In terms of federal public law, the Burger and Rehnquist Court 
has shored up the discretionary theory at nearly every tum. The 
Court declined to afford special constitutional protection to poor peo-
ple, or to discern a fundamental right to education. tot It exempted 
"innocent" wealthy suburbs from the school desegregation obligations 
94. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATI5f!CS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLO· 
NIAL TIMES TO 1970 pt. II, at 1120 (bicentennial ed. 1975). 
95. Id. 
96. Reich, The New Property, supra note 5. 
97. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
98. Burtless, Public Spending for the Poor: Trends, Prospects, and Economic Limits, in S. 




101. San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). 
February 1991] Structure, Relationship, and Ideology 859 
of overburdened and racially isolated cities.102 It created both sub-
stantive and procedural obstacles to litigative attempts to place low-
income housing in wealthy neighborhoods.103 It also held that states 
have no obligation to subsidize abortions for poor women, whether or 
not therapeutically indicated and whether or not the states fund health 
care related to childbirth.104 
The Court has implemented the state action doctrine to immunize 
from constitutional review publicly licensed private institutions, even 
if they rely on public funding. 105 It has erected procedural barriers to 
private lawsuits seeking relief from government delay or inaction in 
the implementation of administrative programs.106 i:t has declined to 
provide procedural protections against government decisions that, 
however serious for individuals, do not deprive anyone of what the 
Court formally defines as "liberty" or "property."101 When it does 
recognize the applicability of procedural due process, the Court as-
sesses the plaintiff's procedural entitlements through a highly instru-
mental calculus that takes no express account of any inherent value in 
giving government beneficiaries some control over decisions affecting 
them.1os 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services 109 is 
the Court's most recent statement on the precise issue of affirmative 
government obligations. The DeShaney majority refused to impose 
any liability on state officials who r~peatedly declined to remove from 
paternal custody a boy who was, to the knowledge of the state agency, 
almost certainly the repeat victim of his father's physical abuse and 
who ultimately suffered brain damage from a brutal beating inflicted 
by his father. The majority reasoned that, because the state was not 
initially responsible for the child and father living together, the state 
had no affirmative duty to protect the child.110 
This array of decisions implicitly and sometimes explicitly conveys 
the Supreme Court's discretionary vision of government. This vision, 
however, may be less a reversal in course than a failure to move as far 
in the direction of obligatory government as the Warren Court might 
102. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I). 
103. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
104. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
105. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
106. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990). 
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
108. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
109. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
110. 489 U.S. at 194-203. 
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have moved had it endured another decade. At least some Warren 
Court precedents provided substantial arguments for the dissents in 
the various cases just discussed, but none of the "anti-obligatory-gov-
ernment" decisions from the early 1970s onward required the overrul-
ing of any prior case. The Warren Court had not identified a 
fundamental right to education, health care, minimum income assist-
ance, or housing. Nor had it overturned the Civil Rights Cases. 111 Its 
furthest step in the direction of obligatory government occurred in 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 112 where the Court prohibited discrimination in 
state welfare assistance against recent state residents. Even the Burger 
Court, however, did not retreat from this particular rule of nondis-
crimination.113 That Court also left intact the due process protections 
erected for government entitlements and licenses. 114 At the level of 
legal interpretation, we can thus confidently discern in the past two 
decades a failure to create a new public law along a direction hinted at, 
but not yet fully developed, in Supreme Court jurisprudence. It is 
harder to call this stalled realignment an actual counterrevolution. 
The interesting developments in this area are not entirely federal. 
After the Supreme Court declined to protect poor people against dis-
criminatory school financing in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 115 at least seven state Supreme Courts, including the 
Texas Supreme Court, found just such protection under the constitu-
tions of their respective states.116 If such decisions become common 
enough, and are successfully implemented, the country might ulti-
mately witness significant moves in the direction of obligatory govern-
ment at the state law level. Indeed, although this development may be 
a generation away, increased consensus among the states .about indi-
vidual entitlements to certain minimum benefits could significantly 
strengthen the position of those who argue that these same rights are 
fundamental under the federal Constitution. 117 
111. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
112. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
113. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
114. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
115. 411 U.S. 1 (1972). 
116. DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); Horton v. 
Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1976); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 
(Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 63, 769 P.2d 684 (1989), 
modified, 784 P.2d 412 (1990); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 
1989); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 
162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976); 
Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
824 (1980). 
117. State judicial and legislative developments might have a similar effect in precipitating a 
reversal of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which refused to afford fundamental rights 
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Public law has changed course during the past two decades not so 
much at the level of legal interpretation. Rather, one might more eas-
ily locate change at the level of political discourse and government 
finance. Many federal programs providing health care, housing assist-
ance, employment training, student aid, and various forms of social 
insurance were cut or eliminated between 1979 and 1985.118 The in-
creases that did occur in dollar outlays for the poor during this period 
represented chiefly the increased use of medical services by Medicare 
and Medicaid enrollees and the impact of inflation in the health care 
field, which generally outstrips general price inft.ation.119 In 1985, the 
Urban Institute conducted a study in four cities of federal, state, and 
local assistance programs directed at abused, neglected, and dependent 
children, the chronically mentally ill, and low-income elderly peo-
ple.120 That study concluded that the federal government had sub-
stantially cut back its efforts for each of these populations, and that 
state, local, and private efforts did not fill the resulting gap.121 The 
effect of federal cutbacks was especially profound on black families, 
many thousands of which fell below the poverty line as a result. The 
national poverty rate worsened between 1980 and 1983, although, by 
1987, it returned to the 1980 levei.122 
The official ideology of the Reagan administration was one of gov-
ernment minimalism. The shift in presidential imagery from "Great 
Society" to "safety net" is itself telling. The book of the decade for 
Reagan ideologists was Charles Murray's Losing Ground, 123 which ar-
gued that increased public spending for the poor actually increased the 
poverty rate. The book's academic and general popularity is not sim-
ple to explain. Murray systematically ignored available evidence of 
successful government programs to improve employment, education, 
health care, and income.124 Demographic trends that Murray linked 
protection to intimate homosexual relationships. See London, Gay Groups Tum to State Courts 
to Win Rights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1990, at BlO, col. 3. 
118. Burtless, supra note 98, at 18. 
119. Id. at 32, 37, 40. 
120. M. BURT & K. PITTMAN, TESTING THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET: THE IMPACT OF 
CHANGES IN SUPPORT PROGRAMS DURING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION (1985). 
121. Id. at 174-80. 
122. Wilson, Poverty in the United States: Down but Not Out, 19 NATL. J., 1380, 1380 
(1987); Kosterlitz, Measuring Misery, 22 NATL. J., 1892, 1893 (1990). 
123. C. MURRAY, LoSING GROUND (1984). 
124. Muzzio, Book Review, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1198, 1199 (1985). See generally S. 
DANZIGER & D. WEINBERG, supra note 98 (articles by Starr on health care programs; Bassi & 
Ashenfelter on Supported Work Demonstration, Job Corps, and Youth Incentive Entitlement 
Pilot Project; Glazer on Head Start and compensatory elementary education); L. SCHORR, 
WITHIN OUR REACH: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DISADVANTAGE (1988) (discussing successful 
programs of prenatal and child health care); J. SCHWARZ, AMERICA'S HIDDEN SUCCESS: A 
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to Great Society programs were often in place long before those pro-
grams.125 Murray argued (on dubious data) that increased welfare 
spending during the 1960s created disincentives to work,, but failed to 
explain why decreases in Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
spending during the 1970s had no positive impact on employment. 126 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the adulation heaped on the 
book was partly connected to an official desire to believe a thesis that 
was unrelated to the merits of the argument. 
The durability of the Reagan Administration's domestic agenda is, 
however, far from certain. During the 1980s, many state and local 
governments simply did not follow the Reagan Administration's lead 
in abandoning "Great Society thinking." The response of the states 
was uneven, but even economically troubled states sometimes mani-
fested a value commitment to protecting the poor that was entirely 
consistent with public law values of the 1960s.12' 
Moreover, at the moment Congress appears intent on renewing its 
commitment to social welfare legislation. The Americans With Disa-
bilities Act of 1990128 is the most dramatic example. Although techni-
cally an antidiscrimination law,129 the Act's operation in service areas 
that government quite certainly will not abandon, such as transporta-
tion, renders the Act an effective guarantee of increased support for its 
beneficiaries. 
Presently, the federal deficit poses the main political obstacle to 
major innovations in child and health care. Even so, in its last session, 
Congress voted to guarantee Medicaid coverage to all poor children 
through age eighteen, 130 to establish tax credits for the purchase of 
child health insurance, 131 to increase funds for childhood immuniza-
REASSESSMENT OF TwENTY YEARS OF PUBLIC POLICY (1983) (discussing Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, the Comprehensive Education and Training Act, and other antipoverty 
programs). 
125. Greenstein, Losing Faith in ''Losing Ground," NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 25, 1985, at 12, 16 
(black youth participation in workforce in decline in 1950s at greater rate than during War on 
Poverty). 
126. Id. at 13. 
127. Cf Bernstein, supra note 27, at 110. 
128. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 u.s.c.A. §§ 12101-
12231, 29 U.S.C.A. § 706, and scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1990)). 
129. Thus, for example, Congress does not actually require local governments to support 
public transportation. It only proscribes discrimination in whatever is provided. 
130. Rovner, Families Gain Help from Hill on Child Care, Medicaid, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 
REP. 3721 (1990) (citing Sen. Christopher Dodd's assertion that in terms of congressional action, 
"[t]his has probably been as good a year for children as any since 1965"). 
131. Id. at 3722. 
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tion, 132' to increase Head Start appropriations substantially, 133 and to 
help finance state efforts to subsidize child care services.134 Congress 
additionally authorized over $57 billion over the next two years for the 
first major overhaul of federal housing programs since 1974.135 
What if Congress did legislate the Reagan Revolution out of exist-
ence by enacting such programs as universal health insurance, in-
creased social welfare spending, and a guaranteed minimum income? 
Would such developments mark the advent of a "new" public law? 
The answer to that question must be "not necessarily." Whether im-
proved programs of social welfare would actually mark another shift 
in governmental policy away from the pole of discretion and toward 
the pole of obligation would depend on prevailing understandings 
about the social and cultural significance of such programs. As 
Charles Reich emphasized in a recent essay, the objective of a "new 
property" legal system is to provide individuals with the sort of mate-
rial support that would shore up individual autonomy and personal 
liberty against the state.136 The deployment of new social programs, 
accompanied by conditions for participation that dictate how benefi-
ciaries conduct their lives, however, would run in direct opposition to 
Reich's vision. 137 
A dramatic example of this phenomenon is recent legislation that 
permits, and in some cases mandates, the disqualification of medically 
identified drug addicts from certain federal programs, including Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children.138 We would not have a new obli-
gatory form of government if government may deprive persons of even 
their most basic social benefits because of antisocial behavior, espe-
cially if that behavior is unrelated to the need for benefits in the first 
place. 
C. The Penetration of Public Law 
Whether the objectives that professors and bureaucrats discern in 
our public law have life outside the academy and government offices is 
yet another dimension of the relationship between government and the 
people that may be relevant to the assessment of a New Public Law. It 
132. A Huge Gain in the Poverty War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1990, at A18, col. 1. 
133. Id. 
134. Rovner, supra note 130, at 3722. 
135. Hook, JOJst Congress Leaves Behind Plenty of Laws, Criticism, 48 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 
REP. 3683, 3705 (1990). 
136. Reich, The New Property After 25 Year.s, supra note 5, at 224-28. 
137. See id. at 224-25. 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(3)(A) (1988). 
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would be fascinating to know more about what legal anthropologists 
call the penetration of our public law system, to determine to what 
degree it realizes its ambitions for the regulation of day-to-day 
conduct.139 
There are a number of reasons for thinking that change might be 
occurring on this front, although the extent of this change is exceed-
ingly hard to measure. The upswing in state and local administrative 
activity, in part a consequence of Reagan federalism, increases the 
likelihood that individuals and small businesses, too small to attract 
the attention of federal administrators, will find themselves more 
deeply enmeshed in administrative activity. Furthermore, many cor-
porations and private businesses have only recently institutionalized in 
a truly comprehensive way certain public law norms that the federal 
government articulated during the 1970s. Consider, for example, the 
administration of equal employment opportunity. Even if the years 
between 1965 and 1980 witnessed a sharper rate of reduction in some 
overtly discriminatory business activity, 140 it is likely that improved 
personnel training, access to more sophisticated research, and the sim-
ple acquisition of experience have resulted in greater professionalism 
since 1980 in the EEO offices of corporations, universities, and other 
large organizations. These offices probably communicate more today 
with their organizations on the requirements and expectations of fed-
eral and state civil rights agencies. 
If, over time, Americans become more deeply immersed in public 
law and government bureaucracy, such experience may erode the 
sense of government as both exceptional and intrusive that has long 
been a key to U.S. political ideology. Such change, however, is likely 
beyond ready observation. Perhaps some revolutions creep in upon 
the citizenry unnoticed. 
IV. THE IDEOLOGY OF PUBLIC LAW 
A third, even more elusive variable through which to assess change 
in public law is the nature of the ideological commitments it embodies. 
What do key public law actors think they are doing? What purposes 
do they seek to fulfill? Such questions, of course, do not exist 
independently from those discussed above concerning the prevailing 
139. For a summary of research on involvement with the legal process by individuals in the 
U.S., see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 
(1983). 
140. For example, see the data on the narrowing of the wage differential for black and white 
workers, in NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 297-301 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds. 1989). 
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theories of institutional interrelationship and the obligations of gov-
ernment to the people. Yet, the questions of ideological commitment 
do pose distinct issues, and analysis of public law from this perspective 
may yield clues about legal change that are not evident from other 
variables. 
The past twenty years have witnessed significant changes in con-
gressional and administrative policymaking activity that may reflect or 
facilitate ideological change. One such change is the central promi-
nence the federal budget has assumed for policymaking activity. 
Whether the cause is the breakdown in party discipline, the differential 
partisan control over the two elected branches,· public ambivalence 
over basic legislative goals, the decentralization of congressional 
power, or something else, appropriations measures are just about the 
only legislation upon which members of Congress are confident that 
they will have to act. The fall 1990 budget deal was featured more 
prominently in the media than virtually any other legislative activity, 
inclu~ing major social and environmental initiatives in the lOlst Con-
gress. The economic shock of the Arab oil embargo, the inflationary 
spiral in the late 1970s, and the ballooning deficits of the 1980s have 
helped to shift government attention away from a Kennedy-Johnson 
agenda of civil rights and social welfare to a conservative agenda of 
achieving growth and preserving economic order. 
Such a pattern, of course, may change - and change may be well 
augured by the sorts of recent legislative initiatives catalogued in the 
previous discussion. Yet, the displacement of the Great Society and 
populist concerns by a more elite, economics-driven agenda may be 
reinforced by other institutional developments. The past twenty years 
have witnessed an extraordinary bureaucratization of Congress141 and 
an institutionalization within the executive branch of a culture of pol-
icy analysis that favors cost/benefit analysis over "simple justice."142 
Franklin Roosevelt said it was better for government to fall short in 
the struggle for social justice than to abandon the struggle; 143 modem 
141. Broder, Who Took the Fun Out of Congress?, Wash. Post (weekly ed.), Feb. 17, 1986, at 
9, col. 1. 
142. The major current executive order on regulatory analysis requires agencies to follow 
cost/benefit analysis to the extent permitted by law; it makes no reference to distributive justice 
concerns. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). A recent analysis of the Reagan 
oversight program observed: "The presence of OMB's review program has led to the formation 
of 'mini-OMBs' in the agencies to mimic [Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] review . 
. • • " Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 533, 559 
(1989). This institutional development would seem to have the necessary consequence of prolif-
erating cost/benefit approaches to regulatory analysis. 
143. Address at Ogelthorpe University, Atlanta, Georgia (May 22, 1932), reprinted in J. 
BARTLETI, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 779 (1980) ("The country needs and, unless I mistake its 
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government has tended to ask whether we can afford nobility. 
As a constitutional lawyer, I naturally seek the government's ideo-
logical pulse in one of the most conspicuously ideological components 
of public law, the rhetoric of the Supreme Court. That focus has its 
problems: just as one encounters difficulty divining an ideology shared 
by all of Congress, one faces obstacles attributing a common vision to 
a court that is not only multimembered, but also varying in its mem-
bership, even within time periods customarily denoted as "the Warren 
Court" or "the Burger Court." Moreover, the immediate impact of 
the Court's vision on other institutions or on the lives of individual 
people is not obvious; legislatures and state courts are also rhetorical 
and citizens may be more aware of and attentive to those institutions. 
Yet, some focus on the Supreme Court is defensible. More than 
other public law institutions, the Supreme Court is pressed to explain 
itself- at what seems to be increasing length- and its explanations, 
as well as its results, are widely publicized. The Court's rhetoric is a 
model for other institutions, sometimes shaping, for example, the rhet-
oric of legislation as well as the opinions of other courts. 144 
Just as it is common to speak of the Marshall Court as having a 
nationalist vision or of the late nineteenth-century Court as having a 
laissez-faire capitalist vision, it is possible to ascribe a common vision 
to the Warren and Burger Courts. The most familiar label for this 
vision is perhaps "integrationist," although "inclusionist," though a 
neologism, might be more accurate. Despite the variety of authors, 
the wide range of particularist doctrinal concerns, and some obvious 
differences in normative perspective, the Court's opinions from 1954 
to 1980 systematically presume that a guiding purpose of constitu-
tional interpretation should be the inclusion of historically dis-
empowered groups within the U.S. "mainstream."145 
The paradigm example of this commitment is, of course, race. The 
central insight of Brown v. Board of Education 146 was the insufficiency 
temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a 
method and try it. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something."). 
144. Compare, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) ("It seems obvious that the 
Chinese-speaking minority receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from re· 
spondents' school system which denies [the minority] a meaningful opportunity to participate in 
the educational program .•. . ")with the Equal Opportunity Act of 1974, § 204, 20 U.S.C. § 
1703 (1988) ("No State shall deny equal educational opportunity ... by ... (f) the failure by an 
educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal 
participation by its students in the instructional program."). 
145. For an analysis that both recognizes inclusionist elements in the Warren Court's deci-
sion making and criticizes the Supreme Court for not pursuing that vision more comprehen-
sively, see K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989). 
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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of formal models of equality to capture the powerlessness historically 
enforced on black Americans. "Separateness," the Court said, was 
"inherently unequal."147 This statement would be incomprehensible 
without a cultural interpretation that assigned different meaning to 
white and black experiences during segregation.148 
Over the next twenty years the Court likewise rejected successive 
state attempts to achieve "desegregation" without actually ensuring 
the inclusion of black public school students into all-white institutions. 
One Virginia county reasoned that, if the problem was state-sponsored 
segregated public schools, then it would eliminate all public schooling. 
Another Virginia county asserted that it would eliminate formal barri-
ers to integration by giving everyone "freedom of choice," but reas-
signing no one attending an all-black or all-white school. The Court 
responded negatively in both instances.149 The Court similarly re-
jected the argument that all observable racial imbalances should not 
have to be redressed because some of it would have occurred even 
absent de jure segregation.150 The Court thus required states to elimi-
nate dual school systems "root and branch." The Court was not satis-
fied with meager attempts to eradicate formal barriers to integration. 
The Court's commitment to racial inclusion during the 1950s and 
1960s was evident in other cases, as well. The Court substantially 
eviscerated the public/private distinction, without actually overturn-
ing the state action doctrine, to prevent Texas' successive attempts to 
disenfranchise black voters. 151 The Court, typically through per 
curiam opinions, also extended the "separate is inherently unequal" 
doctrine to every other segregated public facility brought to its atten-
tion.152 The disproportionate number of blacks among ·arrestees, 
death row inmates, and poor people was a likely factor in the Court's 
treatment of criminal suspects, capital punishment, and due process 
protections for welfare beneficiaries. 
147. 347 U.S. at 495. 
148. See Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1041, 1077-87 (1984). 
149. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1964); Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 
441-42 (1968). , 
150. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyes v. School Dist. 
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, rehg. denied, 444 
U.S. 887 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). 
151. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Terry was the furthest extension of a series of 
cases that included Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 
(1932); and Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
152. E.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 
U.S. 244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (restaurants); Wright v. Georgia, 
373 U.S. 284 (1963); and Watson v .. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (parks). 
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Perhaps most remarkably, the moral imperative of the race cases 
spilled over, chiefly during the Burger era, to the protection of other 
historically disempowered groups. The Burger Court crystallized a 
more effective constitutional stance on behalf of women, 153 aliens, 154 
and children of unmarried parents, 155 sometimes through the rework-
ing of equal protection doctrine, sometimes through the reinvigoration 
of substantive due process. Lower courts, following the Court's lead, 
were often expansive in redressing !he complaints of prisoners, mental 
patients, and the disabled. 156 
In general, this body of jurisprudence deployed three inclusionary 
strategies. The first was, of course, an increasingly generous interpre-
tation of constitutional rights that could be invoked in litigation even 
by the politically unpopular. Inequality often appears as a group 
problem, and constitutional rights inhere in individuals, not groups. 
Yet, any resulting awkwardness in the Court's doctrinal discussions of 
social reality did not deter the Court's innovation. The most obvious 
example of this phenomenon is the reapportionment cases, which rev-
olutionized state politics, but discussed political power with a seem-
ingly deliberate obliviousness to the role of group effort in achieving 
political success.157 
The second strategy was the licensing of ambitious equitable reme-
dies, aimed at restructuring institutions to assure greater responsive-
ness to those formerly excluded. 158 Finally, the third strategy, closely 
related to the other two, was placing tradition in a disfavored position 
as a source of constitutional understanding. A particularized under-
standing of some constitutional phrase rooted in eighteenth- or nine-
teenth-century history is likely to take no cognizance of a late 
twentieth-century integrationist understanding of social reality. 
Hence, one finds fewer Supreme Court adjudications of rights during 
the 1970s that are dependent on early legal understandings. 159 
Of course, even if it is plausible to ascribe an integrationist vision 
to the Court, it would be incorrect to regard the vision of either the ' 
Warren or Burger periods as one of comprehensive inclusion. Anyone 
153. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
154. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 
88 (1976). Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
155. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). 
156. Cf. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legiti· 
macy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 692-97 (1982). 
157. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
158. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 
433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
159. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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who thinks, for example, that Bowers v. Hardwick 160 is the high water 
mark of Supreme Court homophobia should read Boutilier v. Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service, 161 the Warren Court's decision up-
holding the exclusion from the United States of gay or lesbian aliens. 
Still, ascribing an integrationist vision to both the Warren and Burger 
courts yields a more plausible interpretation of the elements of con-
tinuity and discontinuity between the two periods. The Burger Court 
was the more innovative in extending the inclusionary perspective to 
new groups, even though it was not as prepared as the Warren Court 
to implement the protections of this perspective. For example, the 
Burger Court appeared to regard criminal suspects as having pre-
sumptively opted out of any claim to inclusion in community norms. 
Even in this regard, however, one may easily overemphasize the de-
gree to which the Burger Court criminal procedure opinions 
amounted to a doctrinal counterrevolution.162 Further, although the 
Burger Court expanded the understanding of rights, it stringently con-
strued the procedural barriers to invoking those rights in court. In 
particular, the Court's hostility toward generalized grievances, cou-
pled with its insistence on a showing of injury particularized to indi-
vidual plaintiffs, made it more and more difficult to use federal 
litigation as a weapon against government delay or inaction in the im-
plementation of social programs.163 
Perhaps the most serious limitation of the Burger Court's vision, 
however, was its unwillingness to consider government indifference to 
poverty as a constitutionally redressable problem. The three cases 
most destructive of the possibility of a genuinely egalitarian program 
of constitutional litigation are San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez, 164 Milliken v. Bradley, 165 and Harris v. McRae. 166 In 
160. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
161. 387 U.S. 118 (1967). 
162. Aranella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger 
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L. REv. 185, 186 (1983); Kamisar, The Warren Court 
(Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), 
and Police Investigatory Practices, in v. BLASI, TuE BURGER COURT: TuE COUNTER-REVOLU-
TION TuAT WASN'T 62, 91 (1983). 
163. See, e.g. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 740 (1984) (parents of black public school chil-
dren lacked standing to sue IRS for its failure to adopt sufficient standards and procedures to 
deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools); Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United for a Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982) (re-
spondents lacked standing to challenge on first amendment grounds the conveyance of 
government property to church); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (low income resi-
dents of neighboring city lacked standing to challenge suburb's zoning ordinance). 
164. 411 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1972). 
165. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974). 
166. 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980). 
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Rodriguez, the Court refused to find a denial of equal protection even 
when state funding formulas meant that poor school districts, that 
taxed themselves at a higher level of effort than wealthy districts, 
could not obtain anywhere near the same per capita student expendi-
ture as in wealthy districts. Milliken barred judges from including 
suburban districts in metropolitan desegregation remedies absent 
proof that those districts were culpable through official acts for segre-
gation in the core urban area. Harris relieved the state of any obliga-
tion to fund poor women in the exercise of their constitutional right to 
choose abortion, even when (a) the abortion was therapeutically indi-
cated, (b) the lack of funding rendered the abortion unavailable, and 
(c) the state was unable to provide any alternative to abortion that 
would respect a poor woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
These cases necessarily result in the insulation of relatively more affiu-
ent persons from any constitutional obligation to support poor people 
through public funding or shared public services. 
These cases may typically be regarded as breaks with the Warren 
Court, although they may more accurately be viewed as failures to 
advance in the direction of the Warren Court. Because the Warren 
Court did not overrule the state action doctrine, the Burger Court was 
able to portray its allegiance to a vigorous public/private distinction as 
a continuation of doctrine. Although the Warren Court did decide 
some cases of special benefit to poor people, such as Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 167 it did not articulate any general principle of protection for the 
poor. A history of the Burger Court would more aptly be titled 
Promises Unfulfilled than Paradise Lost. 
The elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice, coupled with 
the ascension to the Supreme Court of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, 
and to a more limited extent, O'Connor and Souter, casts obvious 
doubt on the durability of the integrationist vision. Justice Scalia, in 
his self-professed formalism, comes closest to a candid expression of a 
substitute vision, a vision in which the Court's guiding objective would 
not be including the disempowered, but empowering majorities - or 
more accurately, groups powerful enough to produce results - to 
work their will through legislatures.168 The conspicuous exception to 
this deference is Justice Scalia's hostility to politically adopted affirma-
tive action, 169 a hostility that evokes some unease regarding the neu-
167. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
168. E.g., Employment Division v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
169. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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trality of his vision. With that glaring exception, however, majority 
empowerment seems the order of the day. 
Does the ascendancy of this vision mark the advent of a new public 
law? Although I find it hard here to discipline wishful thinking, the 
answer is, not yet, probably not ever. A combination of reasons leads 
to this result. First, only Scalia and Rehnquist seem systematically 
enamored of the majority empowerment view. Justice O'Connor and 
Justice Kennedy, who embraces Scalia's formalism in some respects, 
have sought to distance themselves from Scalia's historical particular-
ism.170 In Employment Division v. Smith, 171 Justice O'Connor, while 
concurring in Justice Scalia's holding, seemed positively frightened by 
his unwillingness even to consider whether a minority church was en-
titled to a free exercise exemption from an Oregon law against peyote 
use.172 
Second, the rejection of Robert Bork's nomination to the Court 
was an emphatic political rejection of the Scalia vision.173 In most 
respects, Justice Scalia regularly echoes, in a more affable way, Bork's 
view of constitutional interpretation. Although only time will reveal 
the operational philosophy of Justice David Souter, his confirmation 
hearings were extraordinary. One could only watch awestruck as this 
so-called conservative Republican from one of the Union's .most con-
servative states delivered answer after answer to senatorial questions 
in a manner surely more reminiscent of Justice Brennan than of Judge 
Souter's supposed jurisprudential camp.174 
Third, neither Justice Scalia nor his ideological allies has been able 
or willing to operationalize their philosophy in a coherent or consis-
tent way. The distrust of ahistorical principle as a source of individual 
rights adjudication evaporates when Justice Scalia begins to speak of 
the structural side of the Constitution.175 On the individual rights 
170. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346-47 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring, joined by Kennedy, J.). 
171. 110 s. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
172. 110 S. Ct. at 1606-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
173. Cf. M. PERTSCHUK & W. SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING: THE CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION 14-18 (1989) (describing the facets of Judge Bork's ideology 
and jurisprudence, dubbed by Pertschuk the "Book of Bork," which motivated his opponents). 
174. See ADomONAL VIEWS OF CHAIRMAN BIDEN, NOMINATION OF DAVID H. SOUTER 
TO BE AN AssoCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, s. EXEC. REP. No. 
101-32, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1990) (discussing several "reassuring" aspects ofSouter's testi-
mony, especially his statement that "original intent •.. is not ... the appropriate criterion of 
constitutional meaning."). 
175. For example, Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), accuses the majority of ignoring the separation of powers "principle," 487 
U.S. at 703-04, but makes no mention of late eighteenth-century practice regarding the imple-
mentation of that supposed principle as a means of shedding light on its meaning. 
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front, Justice Scalia appears to approve of historical concern regarding 
the establishment clause, 176 but advocates equal protection as "color-
blindness" without any serious historical analysis. 177 His insistence on 
bright-line, highly particularized rules that judges may impose without 
any conscious exercise of discretion is totally at odds with the way 
judges always have judged. For example, he has repeatedly challenged 
Roe v. Wade 178 on the ground that it requires judges actually to decide 
between competing values.179 That objection rings hollow against a 
multicentury history of judges applying innumerable doctrinal stan-
dards in just that way.180 
Fourth, the formalism of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, most nota-
bly, conflicts with interpretive theory as currently practiced in just 
about every other human discipline. The various strains of 
postmodernism - poststructuralism, feminism, deconstructionism, 
critical theory - increasingly preoccupy our political and social theo-
rists, literary critics, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, artists, 
and theologians. Against their rich debates, an unadorned call to 
"just" read the text, and "nothing but the text," seems to ask either an 
impossibility or a tautology. Reading the Constitution without any 
culturally laden filter is impossible. On the other hand, interpreting 
society is still reading a "text." 
Finally, the majoritarian vision lacks a compelling moral justifica-
tion. This vision is difficult to link with our antimajoritarian Constitu-
tion.181 It is out of step with the country's current social 
predicaments. While the Rehnquist-Scalia wing worries about activ-
ism in the pursuit of integration, our other political elites - including 
corporations, universities, and, of course, legislatures - seem increas-
ingly preoccupied with the threat posed to U.S. economic primacy and 
social stability by our failure to encompass larger numbers of our citi-
zens into our educational, political, social, and economic mainstream. 
We are living in a time in which we cannot easily disentangle the civil 
176. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), Justice Scalia joins the histor-
ically-minded opinion by Justice Kennedy concluding that the establishment clause permits the 
erection of holiday-time religious displays on public property. 109 S. Ct. at 3134. 
177. Compare Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) with Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985). 
178. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
179. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3066 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
180. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3073-75 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that judgments implicit in post-Roe abortion decisions are no more intricate or subjec-
tive than judgments inherent in numerous other branches of constitutional law). 
181. Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64 CHI.·KENT L. REv. 531, 539-41 (1988). 
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rights agenda from the agenda of enlightened economic self-interest 
for the country. 
The most obvious discontinuity between the integrationist vision 
and the politics of the Rehnquist Court is the Court's hostility to polit-
ically voluntary programs of affirmative action. How this hostility will 
translate into actual differences in the allocation of government bene-
fits is hard to assess, especially because the Court's divisions on the 
issue make it difficult to anticipate even the adjudication of particular 
cases. Whether more inclusive programs of social reform would have 
a lesser impact in combating poverty and discrimination is also not 
clear. To argue that the affirmative action cases will ultimately pro-
duce an abandonment of the integrationist judicial vision seems 
premature. 
CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the structures, relationships, and ideologies characteris-
tic of our public law yields a mixed picture regarding whether that 
public law is significantly changing. The Reagan period did witness 
both new public law rhetoric and increased presidential oversight of 
administrative policymaking. Congress did approve real cutbacks in 
those programs that come closest to manifesting a public philosophy 
of community obligation to the poor and to historically disadvantaged 
groups. Yet, much of the rhetoric has been ineffective. Presidential 
intervention can work in liberal, as well as conservative directions. 
The direction of public support for social programs is upward. 
Although agencies have innovated in decisionmaking procedure, no 
major change in conventional legal understanding of the powers of 
significant social decisionmakers or of the constitutional relationship 
of government to the people has taken place. The post-1980 Supreme 
Court has shown itself less explicitly committed to the integrationist 
visions of the Burger and Warren years primarily with regard to af-
firmative action. The long-term operational impact of the Court's sus-
picions of affirmative action is, however, uncertain. 
Having said all this, I nonetheless confess to anxiety that I am 
missing something. ·something about public law does feel new. The 
question is what. My sense is that what is new since 1970 has chiefly 
been the volume of the right-wing voice. This voice may not have 
achieved much in concrete terms, but those of us whose allegiance is to 
a different vision have, nonetheless, had to argue with it more. The 
right-wing voice - whether of a law-and-economics sort or of just a 
traditionalist sort - has been insistent enough to put the integration-
ist, communitarian, checks and balances voice on the defensive against 
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the voice of laissez-faire, individualism, and presidentialism. The left-
liberal voice, perhaps lulled into false confidence by the absence of ef-
fective right-wing challenge during the 1960s, has not been as aggres-
sive as it should be in articulating the positive moral vision that 
animates it and the historical narrative that supports it. That, too, 
seems to be changing if the effiorescence of new journals is a guide. 182 
This hypothesis suggests a possibility implied in the opening sec-
tion of this essay - the possibility that change is not something that 
"happens" and that we "notice," but that it is an ever-present inter-
pretive possibility to which we are sometimes drawn, and sometimes 
not. Looking at numbers and cataloguing programs does not much 
support the case for an immanent new theory of the state. A potential, 
even if incomplete case for newness is stronger when we talk about 
rhetoric, ideology, and commitment. To paraphrase Justice Stewart's 
stance on pornography, we know change when we interpret it. 
The reading of reality that this essay offers perceives more con-
tinuity than innovation in the public law of the past fifteen years. 
What it also implies, however, is a surprising dynamism in the process 
of remaining stable. 
182. Perhaps most prominent among the new journals seeking to bridge the genres of popu-
lar and intellectual journals are Tikkun, which commenced publishing in 1986, and The Ameri-
can Prospect, which premiered in 1990. 
